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ABSTRACT
Affordable higher education is, and has been, a key element of social policy in the United States with
broad bipartisan support. Financial aid has substantially increased the number of people who
complete university - generally thought to be a good thing. We show, however, that making
education more affordable can increase income inequality. The mechanism that drives our results
is a combination of credit constraints and the `signaling' role of education first explored by Spence
(1973). When borrowing for education is difficult, lack of a college education could mean that one
is either of low ability or of high ability but with low financial resources. When government
programs make borrowing or lower tuition more affordable, high-ability persons become educated
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1 Introduction
Governments at both the national and the state level in the United States spend large
sums of money to make education aﬀordable for the average American. Although sub-
sidized state universities date to the 19th century, a focus on making college aﬀordable
for all dates to the Second World War. Starting with the GI Bill in 1944, the fed-
eral government has provided an ever-expanding package of grants, subsidized loans,
subsidized ‘work-study’ jobs and other ﬁnancial devices to college-going Americans.
The results speak for themselves: Between 1947 and 1999, the percentage of people 25
years old and over who had completed four or more years of college increased from 5.4
percent to 23.6 percent. By 2001, direct appropriations and grants at the state and
federal levels had grown to $86 billion a year.1 Nevertheless, many policy makers still
think that college tuition remains a substantial and possibly insurmountable ﬁnancial
burden for American families. Ten bills directly addressing ﬁnancial assistance for
postsecondary education were proposed in Congress during 2003.2 Both main candi-
dates in the 2004 U.S. presidential election advocate making college more aﬀordable.
Bush touts his plan for “Strengthening Access to Post-Secondary Education and Job
Training.”3 The Kerry campaign website says, “... every young person who works
hard and wants to go to college should be able to aﬀord it.”4
Why does everyone think that making higher education aﬀordable is a worthy
goal for public policy? Many argue that education has positive social externalities.
But others make the case that broader access to education promotes equality. For
example, Harvard University President Larry Summers said in a Wall Street Journal
interview, “No doubt, without this progress in promoting access to higher education,
inequality would be even higher.”5
In this paper, however, we argue that making education more aﬀordable can lead
to higher income inequality. We look at a world in which education acts as a signal
of ability and households are credit-constrained, and we show that improved edu-




5“Bush, Kerry Duel, Diﬀer on College Costs,” by David Wessel, The Wall Street Journal, July
29, 2004.
2cational opportunity can increase wage inequality. The mechanism that drives our
results is the ‘signaling’ role of education ﬁrst explored by Spence (1973). Following
his model, we make education costly in terms of tuition and eﬀort and the eﬀort
required greater for low-ability persons. When households face credit constraints,
lack of education could mean one of two things: low ability; or high ability and low
ﬁnancial resources. In other words, in contrast to Spence’s model where diﬀerences
in educational attainment can arise only as a consequence of heterogeneity in abil-
ity, diﬀerences in educational attainment in our model reﬂect heterogeneity in either
ability or ﬁnancial resources. The wage of uneducated workers reﬂects the mix of
abilities: The smaller the proportion of high-ability persons in the uneducated pool,
the lower the wage for unskilled labor. Thus, as we improve opportunities for higher
education, either by providing direct grants for tuition or by reducing the interest
rate that households pay to borrow for an education, more high-ability workers get
an education and the quality of the unskilled pool drops, lowering the unskilled wage.
How important an eﬀect is this? We ask the reader to consider the following
question. Suppose you meet two people without any postsecondary education, one
born in 1915 and the other born in 1975. Is your inference about their abilities relative
to their cohorts the same? We argue that any inference about their lack of college
education should be quite diﬀerent. Very little information is conveyed about the
ability of the individual who grew up in the earlier period with fewer opportunities,
while a stigma is associated with a lack of education in more recent times.
In the paper, we formalize the above intuition in a simple model of wage determi-
nation. We ﬁrst consider a static model and frame our results in the standard labor
supply and labor demand paradigm. We show that the assumptions of a signaling
role for education and credit constraints lead to an upward-sloping demand curve for
unskilled workers. Firms are willing to pay unskilled workers more when they are
more likely to be of high ability. Thus, lowering tuition and the interest rate on bor-
rowing leads to a reduction in the supply of unskilled workers, which in turn lowers
the wage of unskilled workers.
We then consider a multi-generation framework, in which households consume and
leave bequests for their children, who can use the bequests to pay for education. We
show that a scenario may emerge in which, as more and more high-ability workers
become educated, the wages of unskilled workers fall. We call this the “kick-down-
the-ladder” scenario since falling wages make it progressively more diﬃcult and even-
tually impossible for the remaining high-ability, low-wealth households to accumulate
enough money to make the leap to education. The ﬁrst generations of high-ability
households that make the leap to skill kick down the ladder of opportunity for sub-
3sequent generations. We show that in some cases, though, intergenerational wealth
transfers can overcome the problem of credit constraints and allow all high-ability
persons to get an education. Of course, this comes at a cost of higher inequality.
We believe our paper is relevant from both positive and normative angles. First,
our model shows that more equality in opportunities can lead to more inequality in
outcomes, contrary to common wisdom. Second, the expansion of educational oppor-
tunity in the United States in the postwar era coincided with a signiﬁcant expansion
in the skill premium. Such an outcome is inconsistent with standard supply-and-
demand analysis, in which the increase in supply of skilled labor should reduce the
relative wage of skilled workers, but it is consistent with our model’s conclusions.
Nevertheless, we do not view our results as a deﬁnitive explanation of the skill
premium or anything even close to that but as a contribution to such an explanation.
Moreover, in the model we take the extreme position that education plays only a
signaling role, an assumption that was made purely for expositional ease. Adding a
productivity-enhancing aspect to education would not change our basic results.6
The paper proceeds as follows. In the remainder of this section, we discuss the
relevant literature. In Section 2, we discuss our static model. In Section 3, we extend
the model to a multi-generation world. In Section 4 we look at empirical evidence. A
brief conclusion follows in Section 5.
1.1 Related literature
Our work touches on three bodies of literature in economics. First, researchers start-
ing with Spence (1973) have explored the role of signaling in labor markets. Since
Spence’s seminal article in 1973, the debate over the validity of education as a signal
versus its value in building human capital has been heated. A review of the debate
can be found in Fang (2000). Bedard (2001) argues for the signiﬁcance of the role
of signaling, examining the eﬀect of increased access to universities on individuals’
incentives to drop out of high school. She provides empirical evidence that signaling
has a role in determining behavior. In the paper most similar to ours, Krugman
(2000) argues that signaling could play a role in the expansion of wage inequality in
the post-war era. In Krugman’s model, households do not face credit constraints,
and the increase in wage inequality comes from moving from one equilibrium with
low inequality to another with high inequality. Our model does allow for multiple
equilibria with high and low inequality, but multiple equilibria do not play a role in
our analysis of the dynamics of the skill premium.
6We discuss the impact of productivity enhancing education in section 3.4.
4Researchers have explored many reasons why wage inequality has changed over
time in the United States and in other countries. Most studies analyzing the college
premium have focused on demand factors; technology-skill complementarities and
international trade’s eﬀect on skill composition are the most prominent explanations.
For surveys of the literature, see Acemoglu (2002), Levy and Murnane (1992), and
Aghion et al. (1999). Katz and Murphy (1992) also point to the rate of change in the
supply of college graduates as one explanation of the data. Theoretical studies have
had diﬃculty in capturing two aspects of the increasing skill premium: the decline of
unskilled wages over the past 25 years and an endogenous increase in education levels.
Acemoglu (1999) and Caselli (1999) resolve the ﬁrst issue since the capital/labor ratio
for unskilled workers falls endogenously in their papers. Acemoglu (1998) addresses
the second issue. Galor and Moav (2000) and Gould, Moav, and Weinberg (2001)
are able to capture both aspects, with the ﬁrst coming through a depreciation of skill
due to technological progress.
Finally, our model builds on theoretical papers in which imperfections in the
credit market determine income distribution dynamics (for example, Loury 1981,
Banerjee and Newman 1993, and Aghion and Bolton 1997). Our contribution is to
use signaling as the basis for wage formation. Formally, our model draws from Galor
and Zeira (1993). Fernandez and Rogerson (2001) also look at inequality in a model in
which credit market imperfections aﬀect educational attainment decisions, but with
a diﬀerent wage formation mechanism.
2 The Static Model
We ﬁrst consider a static model of wage determination similar to that of Spence
(1973). The individual decision problem is whether to get an education. Education
is costly as worker i must pay a tuition of T dollars and also incur an eﬀort cost ki,
which is inversely related to her ability. The payoﬀ to education is that educated
workers earn wage we, which typically exceeds the wage of uneducated workers wn.
Firms value ability but can only observe a worker’s level of education. As in Spence,
education does not enhance productivity and serves only as a signal of type. We
add heterogeneity to the model by positing that workers receive bequests from their
parents. For some workers, the bequest is suﬃcient to cover the cost of tuition, and
these individuals can invest any surplus in a riskless bond which yields the “lending
interest rate” rL. For others, however, the bequest is insuﬃcient to cover tuition; in
this case, if they want an education, they need to borrow at the “borrowing interest
rate” rB, which is greater than rL. As in Galor and Zeira (1993), we assume that the
5credit market is imperfect because of the possibility of default and monitoring costs
spent by the lender to prevent that default.7,8 This speciﬁcation also admits simple
transaction costs and is therefore quite general. The existence of a substantial wedge
between the cost of borrowing and the return on lending is fundamental to our model,
as it makes education too costly for some individuals who would otherwise beneﬁt
from the skill premium it oﬀers.
Our central result is that the demand curve for unskilled labor is upward sloping.
In a stable equilibrium, reductions in the supply of unskilled labor lead to a fall in
the price of unskilled labor and therefore an increase in the skill premium. Thus,
reductions in the borrowing interest rate and tuition, which decrease the supply of
unskilled labor by making education attractive, lead to increases in the skill premium.
In the remainder of this section, we construct a formal version of the model de-
scribed above. We then show that a stable equilibrium exists and perform some
comparative statics. For now, we take the distribution of wealth as given. In Section
3, we consider an inﬁnite-period version of the model in which the distribution of
wealth evolves endogenously.
2.1 The model
We assume that there is a mass 1 of workers. A proportion π of them are high-ability
workers, and a proportion 1 − π are low-ability. High-ability workers produce qH
units of output when working, and low-abilities workers produce qL, where qH > qL.
In addition to diﬀering in ability, workers diﬀer in the indirect cost of getting an
education ki where kL > kH. Our notion of indirect cost captures the idea, from
Spence (1973), that higher education is more challenging for low-ability students than
for high-ability students. Spence measures the added eﬀort required for low-ability
students to complete college as an argument of the utility function. For practicality,
we model it as a monetary cost (needing tutors, supplemental materials, or simply
time costs). The results would be identical either way. Without loss of generality, we
assume that kH = 0.
Firms observe a worker’s education, the proportion of high-ability workers and
7Aghion and Bolton (1997) model default risk explicitly as a hidden action problem and explain
the development process through interest rate dynamics. We are more interested in the role of
education in income dynamics and hence simplify the capital market interactions.
8Default risk is an important phenomenon in the market for education loans. Such loans are
very rarely made without some form of government subsidy because of the risk. In 1990, U.S.
expenditures on defaults amounted to about $3 billion, which was approximately one-fourth of the
loan volume.
6the distribution of bequests in the population but neither the ability nor bequest of
a speciﬁc worker. Firms then compete Bertrand-style for workers by making simulta-
neous oﬀers, and Bertrand-style competition ensures that the equilibrium skilled and
unskilled wages equal the expected marginal product of skilled and unskilled workers
respectively. Formally,
w
e = E(q|education) (1)
w
n = E(q|no education). (2)
Workers live for one period. At the beginning of the period, a worker of type
i receives bequest bi (drawn from a distribution of bequests for type i) and decides





n + bi(1 + rL).
If she does decide to get an education, then she pays tuition T and cost ki. Her
income depends on whether her bequest exceeds the total cost of an education. If
bi ≥ T + ki, then the worker can pay for an education out of her bequest, invest the




e + (bi − T − ki)(1 + rL).




e − (T + ki − bi)(1 + rB).
A worker chooses to get an education if and only if ye
i > yn
i .
In order to study the role of ﬁnancial market imperfections in an education signal-
ing framework, we restrict attention to parameters that yield a separation of types in
equilibrium. First, we assume that the cost of education for the low-ability workers is
suﬃciently high that they never get an education. Speciﬁcally, we assume that even
with the highest possible skill premium (qH − qL), a worker of low ability will still
prefer to invest her bequest in bonds:
qH − qL
T + kL
< 1 + rL. (3)
Second, we assume that getting an education will be attractive for at least the richest
high-ability workers. If we deﬁne q ≡ πqL+(1−π)qH as the average ability when both
types are pooled together, our assumption implies that even with the lowest possible
7skill premium, a high-ability person with a bequest above her cost of education will
ﬁnd it proﬁtable to invest in an education:
qH − q
T
> 1 + rL. (4)
Equations (3) and (4) ensure that an equilibrium exists where at least some high-
ability persons get educated and where no low-ability persons become educated and
that there are no pooling equilibria where all members of both types take the same
action (for appropriate oﬀ-the-equilibrium-path beliefs).9
2.2 Supply and demand
We now characterize the labor market. Since no low-ability persons ever get an
education, the wage of educated workers is ﬁxed at we = qH. Therefore, we focus on
the market for unskilled labor.
We deﬁne the supply curve for unskilled labor as the probability that a high-ability
worker is unskilled, or P(n|H). From equation (4), we know that all high-ability
workers with bi ≥ T will get an education. What about high-ability workers with
bi < T? Such workers will get an education if:
w
e − (T − bi)(1 + rB) > w
n + bi(1 + rL).
or alternatively if:
bi >




Thus, our supply curve is:
P(n|H) = P(bi ≤ b
∗). (5)
where P( ) represents the cumulative density function of the bequest distribution for
high-ability workers.
9Formally, we deﬁne a signaling equilibrium as choices of education based on skill and bequest
level (ξ∗(q,b) ∈ {e,n}), beliefs by ﬁrms about type given education (µ(H | ξ) for ξ ∈ {e,n}), and
wages as deﬁned above. We employ the solution concept of Perfect Bayesian equilibrium. Inequality
(3) guarantees the existence of the separating equilibrium. Pooling in education is not possible, as
equation (3) shows that low-ability persons would like to deviate. Pooling in no education can exist
if high-ability persons do not want to deviate. Clearly there are oﬀ-equilibrium-path beliefs by ﬁrms
that would keep high-ability persons from deviating (for example, if ﬁrms believe someone with an
education is low-skill), but using the Intuitive Criterion of Cho and Kreps (1987), we can eliminate
these beliefs as unreasonable. Since inequality (3) guarantees that low-ability persons would never
choose to get an education, the beliefs of ﬁrms upon seeing education must be that the individual
is of high ability. Lastly, inequality (4) ensures that a rich high-ability person ﬁnds it proﬁtable to
deviate from the pool and signal her ability through education.
8Figure 1 shows an example of a supply curve. For expositional simplicity, we
assume that worker bequests are normally distributed. In that case, the supply
function is a linear transformation of a normal random variable.10
How do the parameters of the model aﬀect our supply curve? An increase in the
unskilled wage raises the wealth cutoﬀ b∗ by reducing the payoﬀ to education, which
raises P(n|H). Hence, the supply curve is upward sloping. An increase in tuition level
T increases b∗ by driving down the return to education. So, for any given unskilled
wage, more workers choose not to get an education, shifting the supply curve to the
right. An increase in the wedge rB − rL (the diﬀerence between the borrowing rate
of interest and the lending rate of interest) both shifts the supply curve to the right
and reduces its slope. To see why, re-write b∗ as
b
∗ = T −
(we − wn) − T(1 + rL)
rB − rL
. (6)
From the equation above and equation (3), it is clear that for any given skill premium,
an increase in the wedge leads to a higher b∗ and thus a higher supply of unskilled
labor. Furthermore, a bigger wedge raises the slope of the supply curve. Intuitively,
an increase in the wedge means that workers are more sensitive to changes in the skill
premium.
We deﬁne the demand curve as the ﬁrms’ willingness to pay for a given mix of
high- and low- ability workers. Since ﬁrms compete for workers, their willingness to
pay is uniquely deﬁned by the break-even point of oﬀering a wage equal to expected
productivity. Strictly deﬁned, the curve we describe is not a demand curve since
although it does describe a relationship between price and quantity from the demand
side, expected productivity is not held ﬁxed when quantity is varied. What we de-
scribe then is more a ‘willingness to pay’ curve; however, in order to ﬁx ideas we will
abuse the terminology and label it a demand curve.









1 − π + π   P(n|H)
￿
.






we − wn − 1
￿
(7)
Figure 1 shows an example of a demand curve for unskilled workers. As one can
see from the ﬁgure and from equation (7), the demand curve for unskilled workers is
10To see the familiar normal cdf, you need to turn the graph on its side – remember that probability
is on the x-axis, not the y-axis.
9upward sloping – the feature of our model that drives many of our ﬁndings. Intuitively,
as fewer and fewer workers get an education, ﬁrms realize that the average uneducated
worker is more and more likely to be of high ability. Thus, they are willing to pay
more for unskilled workers.
2.3 Equilibrium
To solve for the equilibrium, we set supply equal to demand. An equilibrium occurs
when the percentage of high-ability workers who decide not to get an education at
an unskilled wage wn is equal to the percentage of high-ability workers that a ﬁrm
needs to be in the unskilled pool of workers in order to break even by oﬀering wage
wn. Formally, deﬁne f( ):
f : R
3 → R : f(w
n;T,rB) =
(1 − π)qL + πqH   P(bi < b∗(wn;rB,T))
1 − π + π   P(bi < b∗(wn;rB,T))
.
For a given rB and T, equilibrium occurs when f(wn) = wn. We focus our attention on






An equilibrium is locally tatonnement stable (which we’ll refer to as stable) if there
exists ǫ > 0 such that if we perturb the equilibrium price within an ǫ-neighborhood,
the economy returns to the same equilibrium.
The condition of tatonnement stability is equivalent to the requirement that the
slope of the supply curve must exceed the slope of the demand curve. Figure 1 shows
a tatonnement-stable equilibrium. We can now state our existence result.
Proposition 1 If we assume that (1) P( ) is continuously diﬀerentiable and ∂P/∂b∗  = 0
for all b∗ ∈ R and (2) P(bi < b∗(qH − q)) > 0, then there generically exists at least one
stable equilibrium.
Proof: See Appendix.
2.4 Comparative statics and multiple equilibria
In a stable equilibrium, anything that makes it easier or more attractive for people
to become educated raises the skill premium. The intuition is simple. Lowering the
borrowing rate or tuition shifts the supply curve for unskilled labor to the left. With
a normal downward-sloping demand curve, such a shift leads to a rise in the wage
since demand would exceed supply. Because of the upward-sloping demand curve,
10however, increasing the wage would only make matters worse in our model. Fewer
unskilled workers means that a larger fraction of them are of low ability so ﬁrms are
willing to pay less to hire them. Hence, decreasing the wage restores equilibrium.
In our model, policies that equalize opportunities to get education – lower rB or
T – actually increase inequality. But what about policies that attempt to reduce
inequality directly? Suppose, for example, we introduce a progressive income tax
which equals τ for educated workers and, without loss of generality, equals zero for
unskilled workers. Now,
b
∗ = T −
(we − τ − wn) − T(1 + rL)
rB − rL
.
An increase in the tax τ raises b∗, which increases the supply of unskilled labor,
raising the unskilled wage and lowering the pre-tax skill premium. Thus, the features
of our model, credit constraints and signaling, accentuate the equalizing eﬀects of a
progressive income tax.
We summarize this logic in the following proposition:
Proposition 2 In any stable equilibrium, a fall in either the borrowing rate or tuition
increases the skill premium. Imposing a progressive tax rate τ lowers the skill premium.
Multiple equilibria are endemic to our model. Generically, there are an odd num-
ber N of equilibria, and (N − 1)/2 + 1 of them are stable. If we assume that the
distribution of bequests is normal, then we can have as many as three equilibria, two
of which are stable. Figure 2 shows an example. Multiple equilibria emerge when
the concentration of workers strengthens to such a point that the slope of the supply
curve drops below that of the demand curve. Starting at a stable equilibrium, an
increase in the unskilled wage leads both supply and demand to increase, which ini-
tially results in excess demand. But when we hit the high-concentration part of the
distribution, supply increases more quickly than demand, and we get to an unstable
equilibrium. Overall, the intuition for multiple equilibria is straightforward. Since
increases in the unskilled wage lead to increases in both supply and demand, we can
get an equilibrium in which the skill premium is low and few get an education and an
equilibrium in which the skill premium is high and almost everyone gets an education.
To see why stability is important, consider Figure 2, which shows a model in which
there are both stable and unstable equilibria. A reduction in tuition shifts the whole
supply curve inward. In the two stable equilibria, such a shift leads to a reduction
in the number of unskilled workers and a reduction in their wage. In the unstable
equilibrium, an upward shift in supply leads to an increase in both the wage and
11the number of unskilled workers. Hence, in an unstable equilibrium, the comparative
statics that we discuss in the proposition would generate the opposite results.
3 The Dynamic Model
In Section 2, we showed how the distribution of wealth aﬀects both the equilibrium
level of educational attainment and the equilibrium skill premium. But in a multi-
generation world, both the level of educational attainment and the wage aﬀect the
wealth distribution of future generations, thus having a feedback eﬀect on the steady-
state levels of educational attainment and the skill premium. For example, if the
wage for unskilled labor is high, an individual who fails to get an education in the
present generation may still accumulate enough savings to allow the next genera-
tion to get an education, thus driving up the skill premium. Alternatively, if the
borrowing interest rate is suﬃciently high, an individual may be able to aﬀord an
education this generation, but that investment may deplete her savings so much that
the next generation may forgo an education, driving down the skill premium. In this
section, we generalize our model and characterize the evolution of the equilibrium
skill premium and the level of educational attainment over generations. We consider
dynasties composed of individuals similar to those in the previous section with the
exception that they derive utility not just from consumption but also from bequests
to their children. To simplify the exposition, we will refer to the bequest received by
the time t generation as the wealth of a dynasty at time t.
There are two possible outcomes of the dynamics in our model. In Case 1, the
population separates into two groups; all high-ability dynasties with initial wealth
above a certain level get an education and all those with wealth below that level
end up unskilled, regardless of whether they initially could aﬀord an education. In
this case, the skill premium falls over time. In Case 2, all high-ability, uneducated
dynasties initially experience intergenerational wealth growth, and some make the
leap to skill. If the initial number of uneducated, high-ability workers is relatively
small, all high-ability dynasties end up skilled in the steady state, even those with
low initial levels of wealth. If the initial number of uneducated, high-ability workers
is high, then high-ability workers with suﬃciently low initial wealth end up unskilled
in the steady state. The problem is that increasing skill levels lead to falls in the
unskilled wage, making it increasingly diﬃcult and eventually impossible for high-
ability, low-wealth workers to accumulate savings for an education. We call this
a “kick-down-the-ladder” scenario – dynasties that make the leap to skill make it
increasingly diﬃcult for successor unskilled dynasties to follow in their footsteps.
123.1 Evolution of the wealth distribution
Formally, we follow Galor and Zeira (1993) and characterize preferences over cur-
rent consumption and bequests to the next generation with a Cobb-Douglas utility
function:
u = αlnc + (1 − α)lnb,
where c is consumption, b is bequest size, and α is a taste parameter between 0 and 1.11
Cobb-Douglas utility implies that both consumption and bequests are proportional
to total lifetime income (that is, c = αy and b = (1 − α)y), and therefore individuals
make their education decision in exactly the same way that they do in the static
model in Section 2.12 We assume that each individual lives for one period and has
one child, who lives in the following period, to whom he or she bequeaths wealth.
We call a chain of parents and children a dynasty, and for now we assume that all
members of a dynasty have the same ability. (We relax this assumption in our section
on mutations.) Consequently, we can analyze the dynamic model as a series of static
models linked by the distribution of bequests. The initial wealth distribution for
high-ability persons is given by a cdf P0(b), and the (endogenous) distribution for
generation t is given by Pt−1(b). Lastly, we retain all the assumptions of the previous
section. In particular, we still assume that low-ability persons still never want to get
an education.13 Thus, education is still a perfect signal of ability, and we
t = qH for
all t. However, both the wage of the uneducated worker wn
t and the wealth cutoﬀ for
education b∗
t evolve over time.
The dynamics take place through the bequest function Bt(bt−1), which relates
bequests received (which we call wealth) to bequests given (which we call bequests).
Since we assume that low-ability individuals never want to get an education, we again
focus on high-ability individuals. If an individual’s wealth is below b∗
t−1, then he opts
not to get an education and leaves a bequest of:
Bt(bt−1) = (1 − α)(w
n
t + bt−1(1 + rL)).
If the individual’s wealth is between b∗
t and T, then he borrows to ﬁnance an education
and bequests:
Bt(bt−1) = (1 − α)(w
e − (T − bt−1)(1 + rB)).
11Aghion and Bolton (1997) assume a similar utility function. They point to evidence that parents
gain utility from bequests independent of the actual utility gained by children. (See Andreoni, 1989.)
12Formally, maximizing utility subject to a budget constraint c + b = y, where y is equal to
lifetime income, yields c = αy and b = (1 − α)y. The indirect utility of the worker therefore equals
lny+αlnα+(1−α)ln(1 − α). Since the ﬁrst term is increasing in y and the second term is constant,
lifetime utility is proportional to y, regardless of α.
13We discuss this assumption in section 3.3.
13Finally, if an individual’s wealth exceeds T, then he pays for education out of his
savings and bequests:
Bt(bt−1) = (1 − α)(w
e + (bt−1 − T)(1 + rL)).
Thus, the bequest received by the next generation, depicted by the solid line in Figure
3, is an upward-sloping function of current wealth with kinks at b∗
t−1 and T. The slope
of the bequest function depends on whether the individual is borrowing (that is, if
b∗
t−1 < bi < T), in which case it equals (1−α)(1+rB). If not, it equals (1−α)(1+rL).
To ensure stable dynamics, we assume two conditions. First, we need a low interest
rate for lenders. Formally, we require that:
(1 − α)(1 + rL) < 1. (8)
To see why, note that if equation (8) fails to hold, then a dollar increase or decrease
in bt−1 leads to more than a dollar increase or decrease in bt. So, if bt−1 is higher
than bt, bequests will explode upwards. Graphically, equation (8) means that when
a dynasty is saving, the slope of Bt(bt−1) is less than 45 degrees. Second, we require
that if an individual pays for education out of his wealth, his bequest must exceed
the cost of the education. Essentially, if the individual can aﬀord to get an education
without borrowing, then his immediate descendent can too. If this were not the case,
low levels of altruism by the rich would lead to an uneducated population. Formally,
(1 − α)q
H > T. (9)
Equation (9) implies that the function Bt(bt−1) exceeds the 45 degree line when bt−1
equals T (as depicted in Figure 3). It is easy to see that if equation (9) does not hold,
all dynasties forego education in the long run.
Next, in order to give capital market imperfection bite, we impose the condition
that the wedge between borrowing and lending is suﬃciently large, or:
(1 − α)(1 + rB) > 1. (10)
Equation (10) ensures that the cost of borrowing is suﬃciently large that all high-
ability individuals will not end up trivially in getting an education (as they would in
perfect capital markets where rB = rL).
The dynamic evolution of the wealth distribution depends on the initial wealth
distribution and the parameters. We can separate the evolution into two cases, de-
pending on whether B1(b∗
0) is above or below the 45 degree line (equivalently, greater
than or less than b∗
0). Intuitively, it depends on whether the dynasty in period 0 that
14is indiﬀerent between becoming educated and not becoming educated gives enough
money to its immediate descendent so that its members, too, can get educated. If
it does not (and B1(b∗
0) is below the 45 degree line), the economy follows a path of
decreasing education and thus decreasing wage premia (Case 1). If it does (and B1(b∗
0)
is above the 45 degree line), the economy follows a path of increasing education and
thus increasing wage premia (Case 2).
In Case 1, dynasties converge to two categories: unskilled and low wealth or skilled
and high wealth. Figure 3 shows an example of Case 1 for high-ability person. The
three intersection points of Bt(b∗
t−1) with the 45 degree line deﬁne the dynamics, with
each point corresponding to a stable level of bequests (that is, wealth equals bequests)




1 − (1 + rL)(1 − α)
for high-ability, unskilled workers;
˜ b =
(1 − α)(qH − T(1 + rB))
1 − (1 + rB)(1 − α)
for high-ability, skilled workers who must borrow to ﬁnance education; and
b =
(1 − α)(qH − T(1 + rL))
1 − (1 + rL)(1 − α)
for high-ability, skilled workers who can ﬁnance education out of saving. In each
case, the stable point depends on the relevant wage (skilled or unskilled), the relevant
interest rate (borrowing or lending), and the preference parameter α. Since the
interest rates and the skilled wage are time-independent, ˜ b and b are as well – hence
the lack of time subscripts. But since the unskilled wage can evolve over time, bt can
as well.
The point ˜ b divides dynasties. If bequests exceed ˜ b for a given dynasty now,
then eventually that dynasty will converge to wealth level b, earning the skilled wage
we = qH. If wealth falls short of ˜ b for a given dynasty, then that dynasty’s wealth
converges to bt, earning the unskilled wage wn
t . Falling wealth implies falling levels of
education, which implies higher wages for unskilled workers and thus a higher cutoﬀ
for education (b∗
t increases). Thus, the peculiar feature of our model – that increased










πL + πH   P0(bi < ˜ b)
￿
. (11)
15If there are enough initially low-wealth dynasties below ˜ b, the point bt converges to
˜ b in the steady state; that is, all low-wealth dynasties end up with wealth ˜ b. If there
are not enough low-wealth dynasties, the dynamics stop at a point b∞ < ˜ b. Either
way, equation (11) describes the skill premium.
The solid line in Figure 4 shows the initial situation for high-ability persons in Case
2. Here, wealth levels rise for all dynasties with wealth below b, regardless of whether
they are skilled or not. But at some point, wealth levels of the unskilled start to
exceed the education threshold b∗
t, and the number of skilled workers increases, driving
the skill premium up and the threshold b∗
t down. If there are only a small number
of dynasties with low wealth initially, all get an education before b∗
t reaches the 45
degree line. In that case, we get complete separation of types, and we−wn
∞ = qH−qL.
If the number of dynasties with initial low wealth is suﬃciently high, however, then
eventually b∗
t falls below ˜ b, and Bt(b∗
t) drops below the 45 degree line. Now, of course,
we are in Case 1 again. Households unlucky enough to have wealth below ˜ b at the
moment when b∗
t falls below it now switch directions and watch their wealth converge
down to bt. The newly educated dynasties have kicked the ladder of educational
opportunity down by making it too expensive to get an education. The skill premium,
which was increasing while b∗









πL + πH   P∞(bi < ˜ b)
￿
.
The dynamics for Cases 1 and 2 can be summarized in terms of supply and de-
mand, further linking the analysis of this section to that of the static model. Within
one period, equations 5 (supply) and 7 (demand) determine the skill premium. For a
given skill premium, the bequest function Bt(bt−1) describes how the distribution of
dynasties changes in the next period. Given that distribution, the next period skill
premium is determined. This continues until the steady state is reached. Changes in
the distribution of bequests aﬀect only the supply curve. Hence, the dynamics are
essentially due to movements of the supply curve over time.
In Case 1, dynasties with wealth below ˜ b leave lower bequests for their children.
Those dynasties just above ˜ b leave higher bequests for their children. Hence, the
supply curve for unskilled individuals rotates around the point P0(bi < ˜ b), with the
top part shifting inward and the bottom part shifting outward. The bottom part
is the relevant part, and the outward shift increases the uneducated wage in the
following period. This rotation continues, driving down the skill premium until the
steady state is reached. In Case 2, all dynasties with wealth below b leave higher
bequests for their children. This decreases the supply of uneducated individuals for
every possible uneducated wage – shifting the supply curve inward – and decreases
16the uneducated wage. These same forces keep pushing the supply curve inward and
the skill premium upward until the steady state is reached. Note that we end up
with opposite dynamics and conclusions to Galor and Zeira (1993). The reason for
this contrast is simple; in Galor and Zeira, the result is based on a human capital
argument and hence on a traditional downward-sloping demand function, while ours
depends on signaling and an upward-sloping demand function.
3.2 Determinants of the steady state
In this section, we address some natural questions about the dynamics. First, given
some initial conditions, will the skill premium grow or shrink over time? Second, if
the skill premium grows, will it eventually converge to a complete separation of types?
Or will it stop at some intermediate point? Similarly, if the skill premium shrinks,
will we get complete pooling?
In response to the ﬁrst question, a smaller initial skill premium or a larger qL
makes it more likely that wage inequality will grow over time (that Case 2 occurs),
holding ﬁxed all other parameters of the economy. The intuition for the eﬀect of the
initial skill premium on the dynamics is straightforward. Recall from the previous
section that Case 2, in which the skill premium rises over time, occurs when B1(b∗
0)
is above b∗
0, or equivalently, b∗
0 exceeds ˜ b. From equation (6) we know that:
b
∗
0 = T −
(we
0 − wn
0) − T(1 + rL)
rB − rL
,
and we can re-write ˜ b as:
˜ b = T −
(1 − α)qH − T
(1 − α)(1 + rB) − 1
.
It is easy to see that if we hold ﬁxed (rB,rL,T,qH,qL and α), the skill premium has
no eﬀect on ˜ b but is inversely related to b∗
0. Thus, a lower initial skill premium makes
it more likely that b∗
0 exceeds ˜ b. A lower initial skill premium means that there are
initially enough high-ability dynasties in the uneducated pool to make the uneducated
wage high and the jump to education possible.
Next, using the equations for b∗
0 and ˜ b, the implicit function theorem (wn
0 is a
function of b∗
0), and the assumption that an equilibrium is stable, and holding ﬁxed
(rB,rL,T, and α), we can show that a larger qL makes rising wage inequality more
likely. A larger qL makes b∗
0 larger (which makes the wage diﬀerential smaller, meaning
it is not as diﬃcult to get an education), and does not aﬀect ˜ b.
We now address the destination of the dynamics. For the decreasing skill pre-
mium case (Case 1), incomplete separation of types always results. In Section 2, we
17assumed that there was at least one household with wealth above T. According to the
dynamics, such a household will always get an education, regardless of what happens
to the skill premium. And as the skill premium falls, the number of unskilled workers
rises, so the steady state always involves some unskilled and some skilled, high-ability
workers.
In the increasing skill premium case (Case 2), complete separation of types can
arise. The basic question is whether all the high-ability dynasties can make the
jump to education before the “ladder” of opportunity disappears. This depends on
a minimum level of b∗, which occurs when there is complete separation of types and
the skill premium is maximized. Deﬁne:
min(b
∗) = T −




0 must initially exceed min(b∗). Over time, more and more dynasties
become educated and push b∗
t down. If min(b∗) > ˜ b, then all high-ability dynasties
eventually get educated, and we get complete separation in the steady state. It is
easy to see that if min(b∗) ≤ ˜ b, incomplete separation of types can occur.
A reduction in the cost of education (lowering rB or T) or skill-unbiased techno-
logical change (an increase in qH, holding qH − qL ﬁxed) makes complete separation
more likely, that is, it increases min(b∗) relative to ˜ b. Intuitively, lower costs of edu-
cation or higher qH means that educated dynasties bequest more for a given level of
wealth, making it easier to sustain the choice of education.
Lastly, our model implies that the type of ﬁnancial aid given, low interest rate
loans or tuition subsidies, could be important. As we have noted, a large reduction
in rB would bring us close to the perfect capital markets case, and hence all high-
ability dynasties would become educated. A large decrease in tuition costs would have
the same eﬀect, but may have an important side eﬀect. Large decreases in tuition
could change the equilibrium from separating to one where low-skill persons pursue
an education. This can be seen from equation (3). It is also clear from equation (3)
that lowering the interest rate on borrowing would have no such eﬀect.
3.3 Robustness
In this section, we consider two extensions of the model. First, we discuss what
happens when we relax the assumption that there are only two types and that only
one type ever gets an education. Second, we consider what happens when dynasties
can randomly mutate from one type of ability to another.
A natural question is whether our model is robust with respect to pooling of types
and to multiple types. The answer is that it depends, and we illustrate this through
18two examples. First, suppose that equation (3) did not hold and that low-ability
persons could get an education. If we assume that high-ability persons always get
an education, then it is clear that the static model yields results that are opposite to
ours. If we assume that some high-ability persons may not become educated, then
our results may or may not hold depending on the wealth distribution of the high-
and low-ability persons. Second, suppose that there are multiple types. If we make
the assumption that only the highest-ability persons can get higher education, the
results are the same as with our model. If not, then the solution will be dependent
on the wealth distribution, as we described in the previous example.
Next, we examine the case where the model is the same, but a child may not
have the same ability as his or her parent. This case involves a combination of the
deterministic convergence presented in the previous section and a stochastic process
followed by individuals’ abilities. We deﬁne the transition from generation to gen-
eration by the probability λH (λL), which represents the proportion of high- (low-)
ability individuals who get a high- (low-) ability heir. Bequest dynamics are identical
to those in the preceding section as long as subsequent generations remain in the same
type category. These dynamics are altered when a mutation takes place, in which
case the convergence process resumes at the same income level, but following the law
of motion of the new type.
In this case, there are three possible outcomes, which we summarize in the fol-
lowing proposition. A mathematical discussion of the dynamics is included in the
appendix.
Proposition 3 Allowing for mutations (λH  = 1 and λL  = 1) in the dynamic economy
described in Section 3.1 yields three possible outcomes:
i) Pooling steady state: all individuals are uneducated, with wealth ≤ ˜ b, and wage
wn = ¯ q.
ii) Complete separation: all high-ability persons are educated, all low-ability persons
uneducated, wn = qL, but wealth does not converge.
iii) No convergence in education or wealth
The pooling steady state has convergence in terms of wealth. If all individuals get
pushed down the wealth distribution, there is no way to return. Both types have the
same wealth (b
¯
∞ ≤ ˜ b), bequeath that same wealth, and neither gets an education.
On the other hand, if as in the deterministic model min(b∗) > ˜ b, then at some point
in ﬁnite time all types must have wealth above b∗. When b∗
0 starts out larger than
˜ b, both low-ability persons and high-ability persons with wealth below b∗ bequest
more than they receive. If min(b∗) > ˜ b, then, when the wealth of low-ability persons
19surpasses b∗, they continue to give more than they receive (for low-ability persons with
wealth in (b∗,b
¯
t)). So high-ability persons who remain high-ability persons become
educated dynasties, and low-ability persons who switch to high-ability persons become
educated dynasties. Although the high-ability persons move toward ¯ b and low-ability
persons move toward b
¯
∞, wealth does not converge because of transitioning between
types. Lastly, convergence depends very much on the original distribution of bequests,
although it is diﬃcult to provide general results about the nature of this dependence.
While the pooling steady state is quite diﬀerent from the results with no muta-
tions, the complete separation result is similar. The complete separation result must
have increasing wage inequality over time on average. Whether the amount of edu-
cation increases depends on transition probabilities. In the appendix, we analytically
examine the case of mutations for certain parameters.
3.4 Welfare Analysis
How does access to education aﬀect welfare in our model? At ﬁrst glance, our model
may point to access being welfare reducing. First, we assume that education has no
eﬀect on worker productivity and that improving access to education has no eﬀect on
the production of the aggregate economy and on growth. Second, education generates
dead-weight losses from both the costly signaling of high-ability types (in the form
of tuition and indirect costs) and the monitoring costs on loans. Finally, and more
interestingly, improving access to education redistributes income towards high-ability
workers, which could be undesirable depending on what type of social welfare measure
we consider.
Since Spence’s seminal article in 1973, the debate over the validity of education
as a signal versus its value in building human capital has been heated. It is therefore
important to see how productive education can change the results of our dynamic
model. Suppose that the augmentation in productivity makes individual i’s output
ρqi, ρ > 1. Furthermore, assume that the conditions for a separating equilibrium
still hold. Intuitively enough, none of the qualitative results change, but the welfare
analysis may change substantially. If the productivity enhancement outweighs the
cost of education (that is, (ρ − 1)qi − T − ki −I > 0, where I is the loan monitoring
cost), the steady state of keeping highly-skilled individuals from an education may be
viewed as a very negative result. Depending on the parameters, the steady state may
guarantee that a sizable number of individuals will eventually choose not to purchase
an education, stiﬂing growth. Any policy to counteract this necessitates some type
of permanent intervention. This lies in contrast with temporary pro-growth policies
in other papers (Banerjee and Newman 1993 and Piketty 1997; for a review of the
20literature see Aghion, Caroli, and Garcia-Pe˜ nalosa 1999).
Topel (1997) discusses the implications of wage inequality in a policy context.
Using the argument that demand has substantially outpaced supply, he recommends
a policy of extensive investment in education to soak up excess demand. In the context
of our model, which is outside of the standard supply and demand framework, such
a policy would only increase inequality. While signaling is only one component of
wage inequality, its eﬀects certainly merit further investigation before such policies
are fully supported.
4 Some Evidence on Financial Aid and Wage In-
equality
Our model predicts that in the presence of credit constraints, expanded ﬁnancial
assistance for education would result in increased wage inequality. In this section, we
review evidence concerning three fundamental aspects of our model. We ﬁrst oﬀer
background into ﬁnancial aid for higher education in the United States and discuss
the eﬀectiveness of credit constraints. Next, we discuss the implications of our model
for wage inequality and whether it lines up with the evidence in the United States
and abroad. Finally, we discuss possible empirical implications our paper may have
for the intergenerational mobility literature.
4.1 Federal subsidies for higher education
The key event in the history of federal policy toward education ﬁnance in the United
States was the Serviceman’s Readjustment Act of 1944 (more commonly known as
the G.I. Bill of Rights), which provided World War II veterans with a wide array
of beneﬁts, including (for an unmarried veteran) a $65 per month stipend and paid
tuition up to $500. Behrman et al. (1989, p. 400) emphasize the substantialness
of these beneﬁts: “annual U.S. per capita disposable income in 1946 was $1,124,
and the University of Pennsylvania’s undergraduate tuition plus general fee, which is
comparable to Harvard’s, was $495.” Over 2.2 million veterans attended university
using these beneﬁts, peaking at 49.2 percent of enrolled students and 69.3 percent of
enrolled males.14 Estimates made at the time indicate that approximately 20 percent
of the enrolled veterans would never have gone to college without the subsidies. Gutek
(1986, p.282) states, “Higher educational opportunities were made available to a larger
and more varied socioeconomic group than ever before...the idea that higher education
14See Olson (1974) for detailed data.
21was the privilege of a well-born elite was ﬁnally shattered.” Subsequent G.I. bills for
Korean and Vietnam War veterans proved less substantial.
In 1958, government aid was extended to non-veterans. Under the auspices of
the National Defense Education Act, the federal government provided colleges with
funds to lend at low interest rates to students; these loans were called Perkins loans.
Perkins loans and similar subsequent programs required no collateral or credit history
but had ﬁxed borrowing limits and were typically based on demonstrated ﬁnancial
need.15 The Higher Education Act of 1965 created a grant program and an additional
loan program, the Guaranteed Student Loan or GSL Program. GSLs were handled
by banks and savings and loan institutions and received subsidies in addition to a
federal government guarantee of repayment. Later subsumed under the title of Federal
Family Education Loans (FFEL), these loans quickly eclipsed the Perkins loans in
terms of volume. In 1976, the Pell grant, a need-based grant, began, and the other
programs were strengthened. There were no major changes in these programs until
the mid 1990s, when the federal government began making direct student loans.16
Government ﬁnancial assistance for higher education remains enormous. Accord-
ing to Kane (2003), direct appropriations and grants at the state and federal levels
totalled $86 billion in 2001. In addition, the federal government guaranteed $37 bil-
lion in loans. In Figure 5, we summarize the changes in borrowing. As one can see
from the chart, the loan volume of FFEL loans increased from nothing in 1965 to
over one quarter of 1 percent of GDP (over $20 billion) in the mid 1990s. This oﬀers
a strong sense that the loans were less costly than outside opportunities. Over that
same time frame, college entrance rates for recent high school graduates increased
from 45 percent (1959) to 58.9 percent (1988).17
In Figure 6, we depict the trade-oﬀ between borrowing and saving. The interest
rate depicted as the borrowing rate is that of the Staﬀord loan, computed for each
year X as the rate a person who took out a loan 4 years previously would have to
pay in year X, that is, the rate that inﬂuences his or her decision.18 The rate of
interest on saving is shown as the return on a 6-month CD. For the most part, the
15Borrowing limits do not qualitatively aﬀect our theoretical results, but should shift ˜ b downward.
16An excellent summary of legislative activity and the history of student loans can be found in
Mumper (1996).
17These data were culled from the organization Postsecondary Education Opportunity
(www.postsecondary.org).
18Note that individuals who take out Staﬀord Loans do not have to pay interest while in school.
The Staﬀord Loans (called Guaranteed Student Loans prior to 1981) make up the largest part of
FFEL loans. These loans had ﬁxed rates until 1993, when they became a function of the 91-day
Treasury Bill. We thank Brian Smith of the Department of Education for his help in obtaining the
data on Staﬀord Loans.
22wedge between borrowing and lending is apparent. The wedge between the return on
a 6-month CD and commercial loans is substantially higher, indicating a high degree
of subsidization by the government. The rigid low rates on Staﬀord loans actually
brought them substantially below the saving rate from 1979 to 1984. Around this time
the government’s expenditures ballooned, as can be seen from the sharp increase in
loan volume in Figure 5.19 The loan volume also increased substantially in the 1990s,
despite a relatively stable interest rate diﬀerential. This was motivated in part by
increased loan limits, the introduction of unsubsidized loans, and favorable changes
in qualiﬁcation standards.
The existence of a wedge between rates for borrowing and rates for saving makes
a great deal of sense when one observes the massive amount of organization in place
to prevent defaults. Many state guarantee agencies and secondary market loan as-
sociations exist solely to recover loans.20 Nevertheless, the prevalence of default is
quite signiﬁcant – in 1990 federal expenditures due to defaults amounted to approx-
imately $3 billion, representing about one-half of total federal expenditures on loans
and one-quarter of the loan volume in that year.21
Although suggestive, current evidence is inconclusive on the eﬀect of credit con-
straints on educational attainment. The main fact on which researchers seem to agree
is that cost represents a substantial deterrent to college attendance. The general con-
sensus, as discussed in Kane (2003), is that a $1000 increase in college costs leads
to a 4 percentage point fall in the rate of college attendance.22 Cameron and Taber
(2004) and others argue that more direct approaches show that borrowing constraints
do not aﬀect the education decision.23 But Cameron and Taber conclude that their
results do not imply “that credit market constraints would not exist in the absence of
the assortment of private and government programs currently available. Instead, [the]
ﬁndings show that given the large range of subsidies to education that currently exist,
there is no evidence of underinvestment in schooling resulting from credit access.”
19We also note that college tuition, in real terms, was very stable in the 1970s and did not begin
growing substantially until 1982. (These data can be found in College Board 1999b.)
20These are organizations which specialize in student loans and purchase them from primary
lenders, that is, banks and savings and loan institutions. The largest of these is the Student Loan
Marketing Association (better known as Sallie Mae).
21These numbers are drawn from Mumper (1996) and the College Board (1999a).
22That, in and of itself, is not evidence of credit constraints. As Dynarski (2003) says, “Since
grant aid reduces the cost of schooling and thereby increases its optimal level, a behavioral response
does not, per se, indicate the presence of capital constraints.”
23Other examples include Carneiro and Heckman (2002), Shea (2000), and Keane and Wolpin
(2001).
234.2 The skill premium
We have argued that ﬁnancial constraints limiting access to education aﬀect the in-
formational value of education and hence the returns to education. How important
an eﬀect is this? A full empirical investigation of the signiﬁcance of ﬁnancial con-
straints on wage inequality is beyond the scope of this paper. However, we believe
the mechanism discussed above has some interest, given the patterns of inequality
observed in the data.24
The basic facts about wage inequality are agreed upon. The college skill premium
in the United States rose in the 1950s, ﬂattened for the ﬁrst half of the 1960s before
rising again in the second half of that decade, fell in the 1970s, and began a very steep
ascent around 1979.25 In the standard labor supply/labor demand model, increasing
relative demand for skilled labor can explain the simultaneous increase in the supply
of college graduates and an increasing skill premium. A common explanation for
the increase in relative demand is skill-biased technological change; but as Krugman
(2000) points out, the evidence for skill-biased technological change is indirect: “...it is
essentially inferred from the fact that the relative wage and the relative employment
of the highly educated have moved in the same direction.” The innovation of our
model is that it generates an increasing skill premium via a supply shift.
One key element of our theory is that perceptions of the ability of educated workers
have changed over time as a result of enhanced opportunities for higher education.
Although we have no hard evidence for this, anecdotal evidence exists. In a 1960
report to the American Economic Association (Becker 1960), Gary Becker wrote:
“The available evidence [indicates] that many who do not go to college rank higher
in I.Q. or grades than many who do.” Forty years later, Stephen Rose, a senior
economist at the Educational Testing Service illustrated how much has changed: “You
need a bachelor’s degree just to apply for the best jobs. That is how it should be
for doctors, lawyers, scientists, engineers, computer specialists. But look at middle-
level managers. In 1960, only 40 percent had a bachelor’s degree and today it is 80
percent.”26
24A careful reader will note that the source of the inequality in the model is that the wages of
the skilled are constant while the wages of the unskilled decline. The constant wage of the skilled
is contrary to evidence, although we can change the model to include ability growth over time to
capture this and maintain our basic results. The decline in the wages of the unskilled that our model
displays is quite interesting; as we discussed in the introduction, this decline is an empirical fact
that most theoretical models are unable to capture.
25For graphs and analysis see Goldin and Margo (1992), Katz and Murphy (1992), and Katz and
Autor (1999).
26As quoted in The New York Times, July 23, 2000.
24There are several reasons to question our argument. First, our model suggests
that inequality should have risen throughout the entire postwar period, as ﬁnancial
assistance for higher education became an integral part of the education decision.
In fact, the history of inequality in the postwar era is more nuanced, as mentioned
above. Obviously, this could be a failure of the “all else equal” assumption of our
model. Another issue is that our model says that any reduction in ﬁnancial constraints
should increase wage inequality for the cohorts receiving education now, but not for
cohorts who have already reached maturity and cannot easily change their education
status. In general as time progresses, a larger and larger fraction of cohorts take
advantage of the lower constraints, and overall wage inequality increases as well.
Card and Lemieux (2001) argue that we can account for much of the sharp increase
in the college premium since 1980 by the youngest cohorts, a result consistent with
our theory. In addition, there is a spike upwards in the skill premium from 1959
to 1970 for the youngest cohort, while the older cohort’s premium remains ﬂat.27
Card and Lemieux, however, argue that demand for skilled labor outpaced increasing
educational attainment.
Second, our model predicts a negative relationship between college tuition (T)
and the skill premium, which contradicts cross-country evidence. Tuition costs are
generally higher in the United States than in other OECD countries.28 In particular,
well-known private colleges and universities in the United States often charge tuition
that exceeds that of even public universities in the United States by an order of
magnitude. At the same time, the skill premium in the United States exceeds that
of almost all other OECD countries. (See Figure 7.) While we cannot fully account
for the evidence, we oﬀer insight ﬁrst on why other countries may not match the
assumptions of our model, and second on implications of our model that might begin
to explain the diﬀerences.
As we discussed in Section 3.2, a large reduction in tuition may have substantially
diﬀerent eﬀects than reductions in the interest rate. One possibility is the violation of
our critical assumption in equation (3). This could force a switch to a pooling equi-
librium, starting diﬀerent dynamics than the ones we describe. Moreover, subsidizing
tuition could induce some form of rationing of educational resources. This may come
in the form of entrance exams (which skew toward favoring those who are well oﬀ) or
27See Figure 1 in Card and Lemieux (2001).
28Even with universal access to universities, there may be hidden costs to students though: op-
portunity costs and living expenses. In many countries, it is diﬃcult to ﬁnd credit markets that
cover these costs, although several European countries have established funding for these expenses
through grants and loans (see OECD 1990).
25through personal connections and does not readily ﬁt into our model of signaling.29
Two interesting features of our model may partially explain the observed relation-
ship between the skill premium and tuition. First, Europeans countries have lower
tuition but also have highly progressive tax codes. According to our model, progres-
sive taxes depress college attainment and therefore reduce pretax wage inequality.
Second, our model allows for multiple stable equilibria. Figure 2 shows a situation
with both a high-equality and a high-inequality equilibrium in spite of identical levels
of tuition. These two factors depend on the level of education being correlated with
the skill premium. Looking at a comparison of Europe and the United States, this
is not entirely clear, although a restriction to G7 countries (underlined in Figure 7
displays this pattern.
4.3 Intergenerational mobility
Our analysis can provide insight into intergenerational wealth mobility. The literature
on mobility is increasing, and Charles and Hurst (2003) provide the ﬁrst paper that
looks at the correlation of wealth across generations (previous papers only look at
the correlation of earnings). Nevertheless, there are limitations to empirical testing:
Charles and Hurst (2003) use the PSID and have in their sample only 1,491 parent-
child pairs. This is actually a large number - Solon (1992) uses only 348 pairs for his
analysis of earnings mobility. Hence, we do not perform any empirical analysis and
only oﬀer potential avenues of investigation.
First, assume that we are in Case 2, where the economy increases the amount
of education and high-wage employees and decreases the wage of the uneducated
population. In that case, among the high-ability types, all income groups except for
the wealthiest pass on a larger bequest to their children than they received. Not only
do the wealthiest families move down in wealth, but their rate of decrease gets slower
with each successive generation (as some of them get absorbed by ¯ b). The rate of
downward mobility is something interesting to test, but could involve great diﬃculty
given that it involves observing a minimum of three generations.
Second, our paper makes the case that the elasticity of child wealth with respect
to parental wealth should be diﬀerent for diﬀerent wealth groups. Speciﬁcally, the
middle group (educated but borrowing) is more mobile in terms of wealth than the
29A recent highly publicized illustration of the value of connections came from Britain, where a
young woman from a public high school was denied acceptance to Oxford while at the same gaining
admission to Harvard. In the ensuing scandal, the following fact surfaced: “Among pupils with the
same qualiﬁcations, applicants from private schools are 25 times more likely to gain admission to
[Oxford or Cambridge] than those from state schools” (New York Times, 6/3/00).
26rich and the poor and should have the highest elasticity. This is evident from the
slopes of the bequest function for high-ability workers: The slope is (1−α)(1+rB) for
middle types and is (1−α)(1+rL) for other types. This could be tested by regression
techniques, but may suﬀer from the lack of available data points. The usual regression
which involves regressing the log of child’s wealth on the log of parent’s wealth could
be augmented with a quadratic parent’s wealth term to add curvature and see whether
there is a diﬀerence in the elasticities for diﬀerent wealth groups.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we argue that reducing ﬁnancial constraints for postsecondary education
can increase wage inequality. We use a dynamic approach based on job market
signaling, a mechanism that has been unexplored in recent work on wage inequality.
A reduction in the interest rate increases the number of the poor who become educated
in steady state, lowering the average ability of the uneducated pool, and therefore
increasing the wage gap. In the last 60 years, two events (the G.I. Bill and the
Higher Education Act) signiﬁcantly reduced the cost of higher education, while many
subsequent acts have further increased its overall accessibility.
Our work suggests two natural directions for future research. First, researchers
have identiﬁed many factors that, in theory, might aﬀect the relationship between
wages and education. One natural question to ask is how these other factors interact
with the mechanism we have described here. Second, while we have provided some
stylized facts that are consistent with the ideas in this paper, formal empirical tests
can provide evidence on how changing ﬁnancial opportunities have aﬀected wage
inequality.
6 Appendix
6.1 Proof of proposition 1
Proof: b∗(we − wn) is continuous. By assumption, P( ) is continuous, then f( ) is
continuous. The unskilled wage must lie in a convex, compact set. The maximum skill
premium occurs when all high-ability persons become educated and equals qH − qL.
The minimum skill premium occurs when no high-ability persons become educated
and equals qH − q. Therefore, by the Brouwer Fixed Point Theorem, an equilibrium
exists. Since ∂P/∂b∗  = 0 for all b∗, we know that at any equilibrium, ∂f/∂T  = 0
and ∂f/∂rB  = 0. Thus, rank(Df(we − wn,T,rB)) = 1. By the Transversality
27Theorem (Proposition 17.D.3 in Mas-Colell, Whinston, and Green (1995), for almost
every choice of T,rB ∂f(we − wn,T,rB))/∂we − wn  = 0. By the implicit function
theorem, equilibrium we − wn depends diﬀerentiably on T and rB. Now, we show
that at least one of the regular equilibria must be stable. Now, consider the minimum
possible equilibrium price. Assumption (2) in the Proposition implies that at the
minimum possible price, we have excess supply. By continuity and Assumption (2)
again we know that at that equilibrium, a decrease in prices leads to excess supply,
and by regularity we know that an increase in prices leads to excess demand. So, the
minimum price equilibrium must be stable.
6.2 Mutations
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t−1 is the number of type q people at time t−1 and P
q
t−1(b) is the distribution
of bequests from parents of type q to children living in time t. The uneducated
wage equals the expectation of ability of an uneducated worker, given the transitions
between types and the bequest distributions. Furthermore, we can solve the diﬀerence
equations for transitions between types to ﬁnd that NL




t = (λH + λL − 1)t(π − 1−λL
2−λH−λL) + 1−λL
2−λH−λL. Lastly, we
deﬁne the education decision as in Section 2.2. We make the following simplifying
assumption in order to examine properties of a solution to this type of dynamics:
λH + λL = 1. We can call this the zero-correlation case, that is, the probability of
having a type q child is the same for both types of parents.
Since λH + λL = 1, for all t, NL
t = 1 − λH and NH









This is increasing in Y since qL < qH. We ﬁx some time t, and examine the change
in Y at time t + 1. Let ∆P L = P L
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First, assume that b∗








1+i+T > 0, since more people are shifting downwards towards b∗
t−1.
Deﬁne ∆Y = NL(1−λL)∆P L+NHλH∆P H. It is then straightforward to show that,
28given λH + λL = 1, ∆Y > 0. This implies that wn
t (b∗
t−1) > wn
t−1, which, using the




Next, assume that b∗
t−1 > ˜ b. Now ε1 < 0 and ε2 < 0, since people are shifting
towards from b∗




Lastly, assume that b∗
t−1 = ˜ b. At this point, ε2 = 0, since no high-ability persons
will ﬂow above or below b∗
t−1. Low-ability persons still ﬂow downwards, however,
making ε1 > 0. In this case, ∆Y > 0 and b∗
t > b∗
t−1.
We can now discuss the results listed in the proposition. Movements in the thresh-
old for education b∗
t are similar to the no-mutations case for b∗
t−1 < ˜ b and b∗
t−1 > ˜ b.
The lack of stability at b∗
t−1 = ˜ b is diﬀerent and leads us to the pooling steady state
of no education. If all high-bequest individuals have been pushed down the bequest
distribution, then P H
t−1(b∗
t−1) = P L
t−1(b∗
t−1) = 1 at some time t. At this point ∆Y = 0,
and the wage and cutoﬀ will stay the same (wn = ¯ q). This can happen at any point
where, in the period before the steady state begins, the last high-bequest individuals
inch down the distribution, that is, where b ≤ ˜ b.
In the case of complete separation, P H
t−1(b∗
t−1) = P L
t−1(b∗
t−1) = 0 at some time t.
This implies that b∗
t = b∗
t−1 and ∆Y = 0, meaning that the uneducated pool contains
no highly-skilled workers and wn = qL.
This type of convergence may not occur, for if b∗
t−1 < ˜ b, and there still remain
individuals at the higher end of the bequest distribution, we have shown that there
is no bequest b that is stable. In addition, all of the movement is directed towards ˜ b,
but ˜ b is not a stable point.
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34Figure 3: Eﬀect of an increase in wn
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Figure 4: Eﬀect of a fall in wn
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Source: U.S. Department of Education and Council of Economic Advisors.
Figure 6: Interest rates on student loans and on government bonds.
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36Figure 7: Skill premium versus college-educated share of population, ages 25 to 64,










































Percent of Population with College Education
Notes:
1. Skill premium deﬁned as percentage by which earnings of college-educated workers exceed
those of high school graduates
2. For college educated workers, we use the OECD deﬁnition, “Tertiary Education Type A.”
3. For details, see the source, Table A14.1 of “Education at a Glance 2003” at www.oecd.org.
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